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BYPASSING HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: 
HOW THE NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT SET A 
DAMAGING PRECEDENT FOR PREGNANT 
MINORS SEEKING ABORTION CARE 
By: Carlie J Armstrong 
"[T}he Legislature has assumed under (the law) that all minors will have a parent or guardian who can give consent. 
As this case illustrates, however, that is not always true." - Judge William Connolly1 
I. Introduction 
In the realm of women's reproductive health, 
controversy abounds. The media and politicians on 
both sides are often quick to co-op the issue in order 
to incorporate it into broader debates regarding the 
scope of governmental interests and morality. Despite 
abundant data demonstrating that women who 
exercise their right to the full ambit of reproductive 
health care come from diverse socio-economic 
backgrounds and faiths, 2 the labels assigned to women 
seeking such care too often range from judgmental 
to offensive.3 The sheer volume of legislation 
regarding women's reproductive health over the past 
year demonstrates the lingering contentiousness 
surrounding these issues, particularly when it comes 
to the right to obtain abortion care.4 The current 
constitutional protections afforded to young women 
under the age of eighteen contain numerous loopholes 
through which states and activist judges may attempt 
to restrict their reproductive health care choices. 
As such, young women are especially vulnerable to 
outside interference when making decisions about 
their own reproductive health care. 5 By analyzing a 
case recently before the Nebraska Supreme Court, 
this article explores the current status of constitutional 
protections for young women seeking abortion care, 
particularly as these protections apply to wards of 
the state.6 
As discussed infra, the constitutional 
protections afforded to pregnant minors are rightly 
circumscribed and appear to be shrinking. For a ward 
of the state, the options available to a young woman 
seeking to obtain an abortion often require her to 
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go before a judge and plead her case.7 As a recent 
decision by the Nebraska Supreme Court illustrates, 
such proceedings are not immune from bias and 
judicial activism.8 To conform to the requirements 
of the United States Supreme Court's opinions on 
this issue, states are expected to institute particular 
safeguards to avoid allowing a third parties an 
"absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto" over a young 
woman's reproductive choices.9 However, in practice, 
the mechanisms meant to protect vulnerable minors 
are failing them. 
II. The Petition of Anonymous 5 and Nebraska 
Judicial Bypass Law 
The sixteen-year-old petitioner, known only 
as Anonymous 5, was ten weeks pregnant when she 
appeared before the district judge seeking to terminate 
her pregnancy. 10 The young woman and her two 
younger siblings were removed from their biological 
parents' custody in 2011 due to abuse and neglect, 
and the Nebraska Department of Health and Human 
Services assumed temporary custody. 11 The young 
woman and her siblings were eventually placed with 
a foster family and the biological parents' parental 
and custodial rights were formally terminated in 
May 2013. 12 At the time of the hearing, the young 
woman was still living with her foster parents but 
indicated that she was anxious to move out and 
had saved enough money to live on her own after 
graduating high school. 13 Furthermore, she stated that 
she intended to attend college but was considering 
working to financially support herself beforehand. 14 
When asked about her reason for seeking an abortion, 
Anonymous 5 said that she was unable to financially 
support a child and, at sixteen years old, could not 
fully meet her maternal responsibilities. 11 She noted 
that she had already practically raised her two younger 
siblings, as their biological parents were neglectful and 
rarely around. 1<' 
At her hearing, Anonymous 5 stated that 
her concerns about her foster family's disapproval of 
her choice to seek an abortion led her to pursue the 
judicial bypass option. 17 She feared that revealing the 
pregnancy could jeopardize her placement with the 
foster family, given their deeply held religious beliefs, 
and she felt that they would act punitively toward both 
her and her child if she carried the pregnancy to term. 18 
When asked whether she would prefer an abortion 
to a potential difficult situation in her foster home, 
Anonymous 5 answered affirmatively. 19 Additionally, 
the young woman confirmed that she had attended 
multiple counseling sessions in the process of making 
her decision to end the pregnancy, as well as undergone 
the necessary physical examinations, including three 
ultrasounds. 20 When asked by Judge Peter Bataillon 
whether she understood that the abortion would "kill 
the child inside of [her]" she answered, "Yes."21 
In 2011, the Nebraska Legislature passed 
L690, which stipulates that a minor seeking an abortion 
must obtain the notarized consent of a parent or legal 
guardian.22 The law includes a mechanism by which 
the court may waive this requirement if it determines 
that doing so is in the best interests of the minor. 23 The 
law specifically notes that the court must take into 
consideration any abuse or neglect when determining 
whether or not to grant such a waiver. 24 Additionally, 
the Nebraska Administrative Code provides that a 
ward of the state seeking to terminate a pregnancy 
is not required to obtain consent from her parents 
nor the Department of Health and Human Services.25 
The law places the decision squarely on the shoulders 
of the pregnant minor, affirming that the decision to 
notify her parents is hers alone and the Department 
will respect her privacy if she requests it. 26 
Despite Anonymous S's precarious foster 
placement and her status as a ward of the state, Judge 
Bataillon ruled at the bypass hearing that she failed 
to establish by clear and convincing evidence that she 
was sufficiently mature and well informed enough 
to make the decision independently of her foster 
parents.27 Furthermore, Judge Bataillon held that 
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she did not meet the exception granted for victims 
of abuse, since her foster parents were not abusive. 28 
In reviewing the case de novo, the Nebraska Supreme 
Court upheld Judge Bataillon's decision and rejected 
the young woman's argument that, as a ward of the 
state, she was not subject to the same requirements 
of parental consent as other minors.29 The Court 
dismissed this argument on the grounds that it was 
not properly raised in her initial petition for judicial 
bypass. 30 With her judicial options exhausted, 
Anonymous 5 was left with the option of carrying 
the pregnancy to term or requesting consent from 
her foster family while possibly jeopardizing the only 
stable living arrangements she has had in years. 
III. Historical Development of Parental Consent 
and the Judicial Bypass Requirement 
The United States Supreme Court first 
addressed whether the Federal Constitution protected 
a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy in its 
1973 decision in Roe v. 1.Vtzde. 31 The Court ultimately 
determined that the Constitutional right to privacy 
protected a woman's choice to end a pregnancy; 
however, the Court noted that this right is not absolute 
and must consider the state's interest in protecting 
prenatal life. 32 To that end, the Court created a 
framework in which the state's interest became more 
compelling and the woman's expectation of privacy 
decreased as the pregnancy progressed.33 In the first 
trimester, the state's only compelling interest involves 
the preservation of maternal health. 34 As mortality in 
abortion is lower than that for childbirth during the 
first trimester, the state's interests are quite limited. 35 
However, as the pregnancy continues, the state's 
interest becomes increasingly compelling to the point 
of viability, at which time a woman may only obtain 
an abortion if her life or health is at risk. 36 
Three years after Roe, the Court reviewed 
the issue of parental consent for the first time. In 
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 
the Court examined a Missouri statute that required 
a parent or guardian to provide consent before an 
unmarried minor could obtain an abortion during 
the first trimester of pregnancy. 37 The Court held that 
without an alternative legal mechanism by which to 
obtain consent (judicial bypass), such a law amounted 
to giving a "third party an absolute, and possibly 
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arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and 
his patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy."38 In 
discussing the rights of pregnant minors, the Court 
reasoned that constitutional protections do not only 
take effect after the age of majority and, as such, minors 
must not be deprived of their liberty interests.39 
While the Court's holding in Danforth 
established the requirement of judicial bypass for 
minors seeking an abortion, the Court did not specify 
on what grounds a judge should grant such a petition 
in the absence of parental consent.40 The Court was 
called upon to clarify this issue in Bellotti v. Baird.41 
Like Danforth, the case at issue involved a state statute; 
however, in this instance the law already contained 
a judicial bypass notwithstanding for "good cause 
shown."42 Although the term "good cause shown" was 
intended to mean "in the best interests of the minor,'' 
the Court still found the law unconstitutional as it 
required the pregnant minor to request parental 
consent prior to seeking a judicial bypass.43 This rule 
effectively would result in parental notification in 
all instances, which the Court found unacceptable 
without an exception for cases in which notice would 
not be in the minor's best interest.44 Furthermore, the 
Court specified that the state law could not allow a 
judge to veto an abortion petition if the minor could 
prove her ability to give informed consent on the basis 
of her maturity.4s Finally, the law's failure to stipulate 
that parents could only refuse consent in the best 
interest of the minor was unacceptable.46 The Court 
also expounded on the Constitution's application to 
minors and noted that the rights of minors could 
not be compared to those of adults.47 The distinction 
between the rights of adults and those of children was 
justified on the grounds that children are particularly 
vulnerable, they are unable to make informed and 
mature decisions, and parents maintain an important 
guiding role in raising their children.48 
Although Bellotti upheld a minor's right 
to judicial bypass, the factors a judge must assess 
in granting an abortion have proven vulnerable to 
subjectivity. The Court held that to avoid imposing 
an undue burden on a minor seeking an abortion, 
she may be granted a bypass to make an independent 
choice if she can demonstrate that she is sufficiently 
mature and well informed.49 If the minor fails to 
convince the court of her maturity, the court may 
still permit the procedure to go forward if the minor 
can effectively show that the abortion is in her best 
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interests.so Additionally, all such bypass proceedings, 
including appeals, must maintain the anonymity of 
the minor and must be conducted in an expeditious 
manner so as not to foreclose the option of abortion.s1 
The Court in Bellotti emphasized that a state may not 
interpose its interests between a minor and her right 
to a decision from an independent court.s2 
In 1992, the Court abandoned the trimester 
framework established in Roe and adopted the undue 
burden test.s3 The Court held that state statutes 
would be found invalid if their purpose was to place 
a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking 
to abort a nonviable fetus.s4 The Court determined 
that the means employed by the state to protect 
the life of the fetus could not encumber the liberty 
interests of the woman.ss In the opinion, the Court 
noted that the new standard did not shield a woman 
from outside interference in her decision. 56 As long 
as her ability to choose was preserved, a state could 
adopt measures intended to persuade her not to have 
an abortion.s7 In its decision, the Court also upheld 
the state's parental consent law because it included a 
judicial bypass in keeping with the rule in Bellotti.SB 
IY. Subjectivity and Judicial Activism 
As the basis for the Nebraska Supreme 
Court's denial of Anonymous 5's petition, the 
maturity standard merits closer examination. Bellotti 
established the standard, yet the Court refrained 
from creating specific guidelines for courts to 
utilize in making these determinations.s9 Although 
thirty-nine states require parental involvement in a 
minor's decision to have an abortion, 60 no state has 
enacted legislation creating guidelines for a court in 
establishing a minor's "maturity."61 As a result, great 
variation exists among state courts in determining 
which factors carry the most weight when deciding 
whether a minor is sufficiently mature. 62 Courts are 
likely to consider the minor's age, intellect, academic 
performance, and financial independence, but other 
considerations may come in if the judge finds them 
relevant. 63 In practice, the lack of cohesive standards 
means that pregnant minors are ultimately at the 
mercy of each individual judge's discretion. 64 Such 
circumstances raise concerns about the personal 
biases of the judges impacting their decisions in these 
cases.6s Whether intentionally or innocently, a judge 
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may incorrectly consider the minor's socio-economic 
status, race, religion, or make a decision based upon 
his or her own religious beliefs.66 Without a clear 
standard by which to gauge these judicial decisions, 
biased determinations will likely go unchecked. 
In appealing the district court's judgment 
against her, Anonymous S argued that Judge 
Bataillon's question regarding "killing the child 
inside [her]" revealed his lack of impartiality and she 
contended that he should have recused himself.67 The 
Nebraska Supreme Court gave her argument little-
to-no consideration, dismissing the claim in a short 
paragraph on procedural grounds;68 however, in light 
ofJudge Bataillon's professional history, such concerns 
are not unfounded. While practicing as a private 
attorney in the 1990s, Judge Bataillon defended 
seventeen members of Operation Rescue accused of 
trespassing on the property of an abortion clinic.69 
Operation Rescue is a right-wing, anti-abortion 
organization that has been associated with violence 
against physicians who provide abortion care.70 
Furthermore, a few years later, he defended an anti-
abortion activist accused of stalking and threatening 
an abortion provider.71 With this information in 
mind, Judge Bataillon's question to Anonymous S 
seems less innocuous than the Nebraska Supreme 
Court implied. 
The United States Supreme Court 
emphasized the importance of a pregnant minor's 
right to an independent judicial determination in its 
decision in Bellotti.72 Without such a determination, 
the Court expressed the concern that pregnant minors 
could be refused abortions by their parents or legal 
guardians for arbitrary reasons that were not in the 
minors' best interests. 73 Unfortunately, the Court's 
ambiguity regarding what it meant by "mature" left 
the door open for capricious decisions at the judicial 
level. The relevant Nebraska state law specifies that 
during judicial bypass hearings, the court will "hear 
evidence relating to the emotional development, 
maturity, intellect, and understanding of the pregnant 
woman."74 Furthermore, the state explains that the 
burden to show maturity rests exclusively with the 
pregnant woman and it "is not solely a matter of social 
skills, level of intelligence, or verbal skills, but, more 
importantly, a matter of experience, perspective, and 
judgment. "75 
In Anonymous S's case, the Nebraska 
Supreme Court did not identify exactly what factors, 
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in its estimation, rendered the young woman so 
immature as to be incapable of making an informed 
decision.76 Instead, the court noted that it placed 
particular emphasis on her rone, analytic ability, 
expressions, composure, and her ability to articulate her 
reasoning. 77 Furthermore, the court stated that since 
these factors could not be established from the record, 
it gave weight to Judge Bataillon's determination 
of her immaturity.78 As such, the court focused 
heavily on the wording of her responses to particular 
questions and looked for any inconsistencies, some as 
inconsequential as her inability to remember whether 
she attended five or six counseling sessions.79 In its 
discussion, the court outlined many of the particulars 
of Anonymous S's situation that could be relevant in 
establishing her maturity. The court observed that 
she was nearly seventeen years old, enrolled in high 
school, and intended to graduate a semester early 
and attend college. 80 The court conceded that the 
petitioner had saved enough money to live on her 
own, but it elected to focus on her current financial 
dependence .on her foster parents as evidence of her 
financial immaturity.81 The court also highlighted her 
lack of work experience but subsequently stated that 
it is not unusual for unemancipated minors to have 
little experience before moving away from home. 82 
In the course of the decision, the Nebraska 
Supreme Court engaged in a back-and-forth analysis 
of Anonymous S's situation while not revealing 
upon which factors it would ultimately make its 
ruling. 83 The court placed particular significance on 
Anonymous S's failure to discuss her understanding 
of the potential emotional and psychological 
consequences of the procedure. 84 However, the court 
seemed to give little credence to the fact that the young 
woman had attended numerous counseling sessions 
prior to making her decision. 85 The court never 
explains why the young woman's age, status as a high 
school senior, and previous experience raising her two 
younger siblings carried so little weight in assessing 
her maturity. 86 Instead, an inexplicable amount of 
attention is given to her manner of speech. 87 The 
court's decision to give so much weight to this factor is 
particularly concerning since it makes no allowance for 
the normal nervousness that accompanies appearances 
before a court. 88 For young women seeking a judicial 
bypass, the experience of appearing before a judge 
often generates feelings of fear and tension, as well 
as a sense of shame and anxiousness. 89 The Nebraska 
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Supreme Court seemingly took no notice of this 
reality when it assessed Anonymous 5's responses. 
Given Judge Bataillon's previous professional 
involvement in the pro-life movement, the Nebraska 
Supreme Court's deference to his determination of 
Anonymous 5's maturity calls into question the value 
of such a de novo review. The Court sought to limit the 
imposition of a judge's personal set of beliefs upon a 
pregnant minor in Bellotti; however, as articulated by 
Justice Stewart in his concurrence, the "best interest" 
standard "provides little real guidance to the judge, 
and his decision must necessarily reflect personal and 
societal values and mores whose enforcement upon 
the minor-particularly when contrary to her own 
informed and reasonable decision-is fundamentally 
at odds with privacy interests underlying the 
constitutional protection afforded to her decision. "90 
Justice Stewart's concern is further compounded 
by the fact that in instances wherein the minor is 
a ward of the state, the judicial bypass process may 
present her sole option for obtaining an abortion.91 
In Anonymous 5's case, the court's slight discussion of 
relevant factors regarding her maturity92 (e.g., her age, 
her numerous counseling sessions, and her tenuous 
living situation) lend credence to Justice Stewart's 
fears that the personal beliefs of the trial judge may 
supplant a young woman's constitutional right to seek 
an abortion. 
V. Not an Effective Avenue of Relief for Those 
Who Need it Most 
Although the Court m Bellotti specified 
that minors do not enjoy the same constitutional 
rights as adults, the rationale for the distinction 
largely stemmed from recognition of the inherent 
vulnerability of minors. 93 Additionally, the decision 
to carry to term or end a pregnancy is unique and 
cannot be equated with other situations in which 
minors' rights are restricted. 94 The Court observed 
that "there are few situations in which denying a 
minor the right to make an important decision 
will have consequences so grave and indelible. "95 
Depending on her background, maturity, and 
financial situation, "unwanted motherhood may be 
exceptionally burdensome for a minor" by thrusting 
her into the adult world with all of the responsibilities 
that her loss of legal minority entails.96 
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Pregnant mmors m foster care face an 
additional level of vulnerability given their often-
unstable living situations and lack of parental support. 
Young women living in foster homes are more than 
twice as likely to become pregnant before the age of 
nineteen than their peers who are not in foster care. 97 
Little data exists regarding national pregnancy rates 
and sexual activity among this population; however, 
certain risk factors render young women in foster care 
more likely to engage in early sexual activity.98 Several 
studies on teen sexuality revealed that young people 
who have close relationships with their parents and 
live at home are more likely to delay sexual activity 
and demonstrate higher rates of contraception use 
when they do become sexually active.99 Research 
suggests that young women in foster care may not be 
as motivated as their peers to prevent pregnancy, as 
they perceive a baby as an opportunity to create the 
family they never had. 10° Furthermore, social workers 
in the foster care system are often overwhelmed 
by the number of clients and do not have the time 
or resources to coach teens on safe sex. 101 Foster 
parents are also unlikely to feel comfortable discussing 
these issues with children only temporarily placed in 
their care. 102 
With an estimated 160,000 adolescents 
living in foster care or with a relative other than 
their biological parents, 103 the Nebraska Supreme 
Court's decision becomes increasingly worrisome. As 
Judge Connolly stated in his dissent, Anonymous 5 
"is in a legal limbo-a quandary of the Legislature's 
making." 104 Of primary importance in this situation 
is the nonexistence of a legal guardian aside from 
the Nebraska Department of Health and Human 
Services. 105 Nowhere in the Nebraska Supreme Court's 
majority opinion is this reality acknowledged. The 
court accepts Judge Bataillon's erroneous suggestion 106 
that the minor seek the consent of her foster parents, 
despite the young woman's correct assertion that 
her foster parents do not have the legal authority to 
make such medical decisions, even if they wished 
to do so. 107 The Department of Health and Human 
Services delegates to foster parents only routine 
immunizations and medical care, nothing more. 108 
When the young woman and her attorney raised this 
issue to the court, it was quickly dismissed as "outside 
the scope of [the] special statutory proceeding." 109 
Without the consent of the Department of 
Health and Human Services, the Nebraska Supreme 
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Court placed Anonymous 5 in an impossible 
situation. As explained by Judge Connolly in his 
dissent, the relevant state statute regarding judicial 
bypass specifically applies to a pregnant woman 
who "elects not to obtain the consent of her parents 
or guardians." 110 Judge Connolly contended that 
Anonymous 5 could not possibly elect to bypass 
consent as she lacked any legal guardian to grant 
consent. 111 A minor's decision to circumvent 
obtaining her parents' consent is a prerequisite for 
the court to hear such cases. 112 In Judge Connolly's 
estimation, a case lacking that component deprives 
the district court of subject matter jurisdiction and, 
as such, the court lacks the authority to hear that 
particular question and grant the requested relief. 111 
The judicial quagmire created by the district 
court and upheld by the Nebraska Supreme Court in 
the case of Anonymous 5 has dangerous implications 
for minors in foster care. The United States Supreme 
Court emphasized in Bellotti that requiring a minor 
to first seek parental consent before having access 
to judicial bypass failed to "provide an effective 
avenue of relief for some of those who need it the 
most." 114 Regrettably, it is now the judicial bypass 
procedure itself that threatens to deprive pregnant 
minors from obtaining effective relief. Despite the 
petitioner and her attorney raising the absence of 
parental guardianship issue at trial, the Nebraska 
Supreme Court refused to examine the issue further 
because Anonymous 5's original petition for judicial 
bypass did not address this specific concern. 115 
However, nowhere on the judicial bypass form could 
Anonymous 5 have indicated her concerns regarding 
the jurisdictional issues relating to the Department of 
Health and Human Service's status as her guardian. 116 
As noted by Judge Connolly, the form is intended 
to be easily navigable by minors and, therefore, is a 
series of blanks and boxes to check. 117 As such, the 
Nebraska Supreme Court's failure to reexamine the 
status of the petitioner's guardianship deprived her of 
an effective avenue of relief. 
VI. Conclusion 
The case of Anonymous 5 serves as a 
proverbial perfect storm at the intersection of 
women's reproductive health and the judicial 
constraints placed on the exercise of a pregnant 
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minor's constitutional right to bodily autonomy. 
While the particular circumstances of this case are 
unlikely to be reproduced in many judicial bypass 
cases, the large number of young women in foster 
care suggests that Anonymous 5 's experience may not 
be exceptional. Unfortunately, young women in such 
circumstances are incredibly vulnerable and already 
face many obstacles to obtaining an education, 
escaping poverty, and keeping themselves safe from 
abusive or neglectful guardians. 118 
The United States Supreme Court has 
consistently held that a pregnant minor has a 
constitutional right to an independent judicial 
determination on whether she is sufficiently mature 
to decide for herself to terminate her pregnancy or 
whether the abortion would still be in her best interests 
despite her immaturity. The case of Anonymous 5 
reveals that the protections available to pregnant 
minors are inadequate. While the Court may have 
stymied parental interference, not enough safeguards 
exist to protect these young women from judicial 
activism on this already contentious issue. As Judge 
Connolly's dissent highlights, the Nebraska Supreme 
Court incorrectly assumed the existence of parents 
to give consent in such cases, which is sadly not the 
reality for wards of the state. Unfortunately, it appears 
that the United States Supreme Court similarly erred 
when it made the damaging assumption that judges 
would set aside their personal biases and act in the 
best interests of the minor. 
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